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The Politics of Peace
By Alexandre Mboukou
and Teddy Pera Chirawu
The past political developments in Zim-
babwe (Rhodesia) have led many people
to ask the question: "Is there a politics of
peace?" The long and protracted efforts for
a settlement of the Rhodesian crisis since
1965, in which round-table discussions
have gone hand in hand with resumption of
war efforts, necessarily point to an affirma-
tive answer,
The crisis has, without any doubt, be-
come a classic situation in relation to the
above question-given the fact that peace
efforts have been sandwiched between
two equally strong, and but complemen-
tary sets of contradictions: one internal
(domestic), and the other international,
Internal Contradictions
I. Nationalism versus colonial imperialism.
In Africa, more so than in Asia, imperialism
was closely tied to a bicephalous colonial
design, In the territories colonized by both
the British and the French in West Africa,
where the terrain was less hospitable to
European settlement, the policy of "colo-
nies - de passage" was devised, ["Col-
onies de passage" --c- non-settler colonies,
i.e., territories not designated for perma-
nent settlement and whose sole purpose
was providing raw materials and markets
to the mother country (metropole).]
After World War II, faced with the irrefut-
ably crushing fact that these territories
were becoming a burden on the national
treasuries of the mother country due to
steadily dwindling mineral resources and
the mounting nationalistic demands, the
British and the French resolved to deal with
the idea of political independence, but with
the economic infrastructure remaining
under the uncompromised control of the
Europeans and the mother countries.'
Also, in the territories occupied by the
French in North Africa (Algeria) and by the
British in East Africa (Kenya), and Southern
Africa (Rhodesia and South Africa) where
the climatic conditions were more hospita-
ble to European settlement, the policy of
"colonies de peuplement" was enacted.
["Colonies de peuplement" - settler colo-
nies, i.e, territories whose underlying pur-
pose was providing a permanent home-
stead to whites.]
In keeping with this reality, the idea of
independence for the so-called "natives,"
as was suggested in the case of the "colo-
nies de passage," was at best con-
templated in terms of a .thousand years,
and at worst, portrayed as an anathema to
the cause of "Western civilization and
Christianity"
Whereas in the "colonies de passage"
the African had to channel his nationalistic
instincts and demands only against the
metropole, in the "colonies de peuplement"
he had respectively a de jure master (Brit-
ain and France as colonial titularies), and a
de facto master (the settler population
along with the semi-autonomous internal
government), Zimbabwe is a good illustra-
tion of the "colonies de peuplement."
As in many other parts of Africa and Asia,
the early European implantation efforts in
Africa met with stiff resistance from the in-
digenous populations. In Zimbabwe, the
war of resistance and liberation of 1896-
1898, left any equivocal doubt in the minds
of the Europeans that the different peoples
of Zimbabwe were capable of inter-ethic
unity, utilizing traditional religious practices
and symbolism."
Cecil Rhodes and his British South Afri-
can Company, despite their victory, ear-
nestly sought the good auspices of the
vaShona and ama-Ndebele chiefs in an
effort to safeguard peace and harness the
maximization of their anticipated economic
interests and rewards. [vaShona - de-
rogatory used by the amaNdebele to refer
to the group really known as vaZezuru.]
Administered since 1891 as a chartered
property of Cecil Rhodes and his South
African Company, Zimbabwe, then known
as Rhodesia, became in 1923 a British
dominion. Within this period, the need for a
greater white demographic strength led to
a sizeable increase of settlers in the terri-
tory'
Along with this increase, the territory
gradually witnessed the rise of two social
pyramids, politically compartmentalized,
yet economically interconnected, On the
one hand, there was and still is the white
settler society divided into four major
socio-economic classes: (1) the large-
scale capitalist bourgeoisie controlling
transport (railways, coal production) and
engaged in primary production and specu-
lation, (2) the white rural bourgeoisie
operating in mining and agriculture, (3) the
white petty bourgeoisie, urban in charac-
ter, (4) the white wage workers.
On the other hand, the African or "native
society" - at the onset structured along
ethnic lines - took on socio-economic
characteristics indicative of the impact of
culture contact: (1) the traditional African
ruling elite, (2) the Western-trained elite
(teachers, preachers, clerks, etc.), (3) the
African petty bourgeoisie made up of trad-
ers and shopkeepers, (4) the African urban
workers, (5) the African peasantry,
The polarization of these two societies
was, and remains, indissolubly linked to
the irrespressible fears of the settlers of
being overpowered by and thus losing out
to the majority African population,
Conflicting theories and positions have
been respectively advanced relative to the
issue of unity of the white settler society in
the political process. D. J. Murray, in The
Governmental System of Southern
Rhodesia, argued that the white settler so-
ciety was not united politically; that signifi-
cant difference of interests existed among
them." Earlier, C. Leys, in European Politics
in Southern Rhodesia, presented another
view which stated: "in spite of some differ-
ences in status or occu pation among them,
the white settlers constituted a socially and
materially privileged group which evinced
an overriding grou p solidarity," and that the
sense of insecurity vis a vis the African
majority was the underlying psychological
mechanics for this cohesive racial front. 5
Zimbabwean scholars C. M. Utete and L.
Kapungu agree with Leys' thesis. To them,
in addition, the policies of the perennial
ruling party from 1923 to 1962, ie, the
Southern Rhodesian Party, were equivalent
to peace treaties designed to placate the
African majority. [The Southern Rhodesian
Party became the United Federal Party in
1962 when Southern Rhodesia became a
part of the Central African Federation.] In
particular, they have pointed out that not
only did these policies remain unchal-
lenged by the majority of the white settler
society, equally important is the fact that
they instilled an array of false hopes in the
African majority.
Paradoxically, the conspicuous pres-
ence of discriminatory legal acts, such as
the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, which
gave the settlers 77% of the economically
productive land." made a blatant mockery
of this unweathering belief in the constitu-
tional right to the use of the ballot box. The
stiff qualifications accompanying the right
to vote (property, income and education)
further compromised the ballot box issue.
That the African society was overtaken
by this constitutional promise is clearly in-
dicated in its various responses from 1923
to 1962. Using, first, improvement associ-
ations such as the Rhodesian Bantu Voters'
Association (RBVA) and the Rhodesian
Bantu Congress (RBC), and later sup-
plementing them with trade union organi-
zations, such as the Reformed Industrial
and Commercial Union (RICU) and the Af-
rican Workers' Trade Union, the Western-
trained African elite exerted itself to bring
about changes in the economic and social
structures by pressing demands for re-
form.
Of the various actions taken and de-
mands articulated by these organizations,
the most threatening and upsetting to the
interests of the white settler society was a
strike by railway workers, led by B. B.
Murombo, in 1945. "By the time the strike
was suppressed by the government,"
writes Utete, "the Africans had won some
concessions including higher wages, im-
proved working conditions, and the
recognition of their union, the Railway Afri-
can Workers' Union, "7
Apart from the concessions won by the
railway workers, the only tangible result to
have emanated from the whole package of
reformist pressures was the paternalistic
and feasible promise from Britain to make
use of her "reserved powers" - meaning,
Britain would veto any legislation that dis-
criminated against the Africans or
changed the Land Apportionment Act. 8
(Earlier, in 1922, Britain had actually rec-
... by the early 1950s, the
quasi-political multi-racial
society had become the fad.
ommended the amalgamation of Southern
Rhodesia with the Union of South Africa.
This was rejected at the polls by the White
Settler Society).
In the course of the development of the
greater social and political consciousness,
particularly among the Western-trained Af-
rican elite, the period between 1953 and
1962 was the most crucial. It culminated in
the boycott of the December 1962 elec-
tions by the National Democratic Party
(NDP).
During this period, Britain, in an effort to
forestall the irreversible wind of change
blowing over Africa and Asia, and in an
effort to safeguard the interests of the White
Settler Society, decided to amalgamate
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), South-
ern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and
Nyasaland (now Malawi) into a federation.
Thus, together with the white liberals, Sir
Edgar Whitehead, the prime minister of the
old Central African Federation, pressed
hard for the implementation of the policy of
multiracialism, co-opting in the end most of
the western-trained African elite into this
scheme - a scheme which was intrinsi-
cally designed to serve as a peace mech-
anism between the African society and the
settler society.
Davis M'Gabe wrote that "by the early
1950s, the quasi-political multi-racial soci-
ety had become the fad. Hardwicke
Holdreness, Eileen Haddon, Nathan
Shamnyarira, and all the other intellectuals
and would-be-intellectuals launched the
interracial association in 1953. They de-
bated, had coffee, and occasional dances.
In 1955, Colonel David Stirling brought
his Capricorn African Society from East
Africa to Rhodesia. This was another inter-
racial association on a much bigger scale,
and many of the leading nationalists of
today were among its ranks. Meanwhile,
settler politics also went multiracial. And
some Africans almost reached the top of
Godfrey Huggins' (later Lord Malvern's)
United Federal Party, notably Joshua
Nkomo, Jasper Savanhu, Mike Hove,
Charles Mzilingeli, and Chad Chipunza.
Stankale Samkange took an active part in
Garfield Todd's Central African Party, and
the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole patched up a
longstanding disagreement with Todd to
join the CAP But in time, the multiracial
phase also spent itself."9
Despite the "operation surprise"
launched in 1958 by the government
against the nationalist leaders grouped
into the now-banned African National Con-
gress (ANC), following the spread of re-
sistance among the villagers sparked by
the African Youth League, those nationalist
leaders who were not detained continued
on by organizing the National Democratic
Party (NDP). [In 1958, the African
nationalist leaders began to organize a
resistance movement in the rural areas of
Zimbabwe. As long as the nationalist politi-
cal organizations remained based in the
cities, the white settler government did not
worry. The attempt by these organizations
to spread the waves of nationalism into the
rural areas was perceived by the govern-
ment with apprehension. To the govern-
ment, indeed, it symbolized potential threat
against the backbone of the entire settler
social fabric. As a result, in the early hours
of the morning of February 29, 1959, Sir
Edgar Whitehead called out government
troops, and loaded every nationalist from
village chairman to the top of ranks of the
party into army trucks (See D. M'Gabe)]
At the 1961 Constitutional Conference in
Salisbury, the NDP delegation - Joshua
Nkomo (chief spokesman), Ndabaningi
Sithole (deputy spokesman), Herbert
Chitepo (advisor to Nkomo), and George
Silundika (advisor to Sithole) - was "out-
maneuvered at the bargaining table on
every issue, and finally, accepted a draft
constitution that gave the Africans 15 seats
in a parliament of 65 - this in a country
where 94 percent of the population is Afri-
can."!"
The rejection of the 1961 settlement by
the Executive Committee of the NDP led to
two major consequences. First, Nkomo's
leadership came under fire. It is reported
that when he was asked about the meaning
of the settlement, he replied:"1 am proud to
say we have moved a mountain an inch
toward majority rule." Further, when pres-
sure was put on him by the members of the
Executive Committee, about whether his
statement meant that he had accepted the
settlement, he was quoted as saying: "We
did not accept it but we are not going to
stand in its way." When Nkomo was con-
fronted by the rest of the African popula-
tion, particularly the African Youth League,
he attempted to exonerate himself by re-
sorting to a very subtle semantic game "I
21
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did not sign it but I endorsed." [It is fact that
Nkomo had duly signed the agreement.]
Second, the United Federal Party (UFP)
of Sir Edgar Whitehead was seriously
weakened. Without substantial African par-
ticipation, it could not win.
With the boycott of the December 1962
elections by the NDp, a move described by
James Barber as a fatal tactical mistake,ll
the way was paved for the sudden upsurge
of the Rhodesian Front Party (RFP), cater-
ing, most important of all, to the right-wing
interests of the White Settler Society. In
1965, the RFp, under the leadership of Ian
Smith, proclaimed the Unilateral Declara-
tion of Independence (UDI).
In looking at the rise of the militant
(armed) phase of nationalism in Zimbabwe
and comparing it to the militant (armed)
phase of nationalism in Algeria, another
settler colony, the one fact that most stands
out is that had UDI not been proclaimed,
the Western-trained African elite would
have continued to operate within the limits
set by the settler regime, further consoli-
dated by British paternalism.
In Algeria, on the contrary, the nation-
alists had forthrightly realized that the sal-
vation of the Algerian people lay at the tip of
the rifle and that a negotiated indepen-
dence through the use of the constitutional
right to the ballot box and party politics
seriously compromised and put into ques-
tions the enjoyment of the inalienable right
to freedom. In essence, the Algerians had
realized very early that "settler societies
can only be overthrown by an armed
struggle or violence by those who are colo-
nized."12
II. Ethnicity, Social Interests versus
Search of Nationhood
In the context of the quest for peace in
Zimbabwe, the impact of the opposing so-
cial and political interests of the African
society and the White Settler Society must
be assessed on the basis and within the
framework, of the inner dynamics of the
African society itself.
The concept of African nationalism was a
misnomer, although it was a necessary
heuristic device. As opposed to the Euro-
pean experience in which nationalism be-
came linked with the sense of cultural and
economic boundaries, in the African ex-
perience nationalism took on the character
of an expedient short-term Black unity
against the white presence.
The splintering of the African nationalist
movement in 1963 into various political or-
ganizations - the Zimbabwe African Peo-
ples' Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU), and the Peoples
Caretaker Council (PCC) - following the
debacle at the 1962 elections and the tacti-
cal exclusion of Joshua Nkorno"? from the
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party leadership of ZAPU - formed on De-
cember 17, 1961 to take the place of the
banned NDP - conspicuously makes the
apology of the scholarly attempts at ques-
tioning the concept of African nationalism
altogether.
[Joshua Nkomo was kept out of the lead-
ership of the newly formed political party,
ZAPU, because of legal restrictions deal-
ing with the composition of the leadership
of new African political parties, in the at-
Joshua Nkomo was kept out
of the leadership of the newly
formed political party, ZAPU.
termath of the ban imposed on the NDP
However, it needs to be pointed out that the
members of the Executive Committee of
the newly-formed party, who were dissatis-
fied with Nkomo, sought to take advantage
of these legal restrictions to keep him out of
the new political organization. In fact, on
the two occasions (ANC 1959, and NDP
1961) when the government had cracked
down on the African political organizations,
Nkomo had always managed to be out of
the country.]
The exclusion of Nkomo from the party
leadership of the then emerging ZAPU has
been linked to the fact that, in addition to
being - among other charges - petty-
bourgeois minded and die-hard reformist,
he (Nkomo) had been trading favors to the
members of his own ethnic group within the
party, the arnalvdebele."
As time has duly shown, the schism
transcended both ideology and questions
about choice and use of tactics, being to a
large degree the by-product of conflicting
socio-political interests fueled by ethnic
considerations and loyalties.
To the extent that it brought different
ethnic groups together, increased Western
education coupled with urbanization
served as a stronger catalytic force in the
rise of nationalism in Zimbabwe than the
traditional African institutions." As a con-
comitant, the issue of control of the tools of
leadership in the independence movement
became tenuously, if not consciously, pre-
dicted on the notion of furthering the politi-
cal gains and strength of one's ethnic
group.
In fact, neither during the stage of pro-
to-nationalism nor during the stage of vio-
lent nationalistic response to UDI, had any
of the various African political organi-
zations (with the possible exception of the
African Youth League), brandished a radi-
cal, revolutionary plank exorcizing ethnic-
ity. The constitutionalist path, to the extent
that it was also predicted on the notion of
politics through the party process, had
planted the seeds of ethnic strife in the
political arena, if and when it led to a satis-
factory conclusion.
Unlike the White Settler Society which
had only to face one major contradiction-
socio-economic interests - in the pursuit
and realization of a politico-racial front, the
African society had to wrestle with the
ever-present contradiction of ethnicity.
M'Gabe, in his article, "Rhodesia's African
Majority," identified three major groupings
in the Zimbabwean African society, all
competing for the meagre resources of-
fered by the White Settler Society: (1) "the
vaShona majority, constituting 80% of the
population to the East, (2) the amaN-
debele, the next largest ethnic group, con-
stituting about 10% of the population to the
West, (3) the vaVenda, the vaTonga and the
immigrant workers from Mozambique,
Malawi and Zambia, constituting the other
10% of the African population."
Besides the fact of history which has,
geopolitically speaking, set apart the va-
Shona from the amaNdebele and vice-
versa, the presence of the Western-trained
African elite in Zimbabwe has served, and
continues to serve, as the leading catalyst
to the mounting problem of ethnicity. Suffer-
ing from what the scholars of the Marxist
school of thought have called "the spirit of
econornisrn," the Western-trained African
elite in Zimbabwe, like their counterparts in
other African countries, have at times ap-
pealed to and capitalized on the ethnic
loyalty feelings of their group members in
their efforts to wield greater political influ-
ence and exercise control over the acces-
sible resources.
The two leading liberation movements
have both solid ethnic bases. The Patriotic
Front (formerly ZAPU) under the leadership
of Joshua Nkomo is dominated by the
amaNdebele, operating geopolitically from
Zambia, which is contiguous to the
Matebeland. On the other hand, ZANU,
under the leadership of Robert Mugabe,
has a predominant vaShona element,
operating geopolitically from Mozam-
bique, which is similarly contiguous to
Mashonaland.
Far more fundamental, at this point, is the
fact that members of these two nationalist
organizations have sporadically clashed,
inflicting serious losses to one another and,
in the process, lessening the impact of their
war effort of liberation against the White
Settler Society.
Leonard Kapungu wrote in 1974: "the
period between June 1963 and August
1963 is one of which every Zimbabwean
should be ashamed. Brother turned
against brother. Families were broken and
friendships ended, and the objective of
political struggle was forgotten. In August
1963, the Sithole group formed the Zim-
babwe African National Union (ZANU), and
the Nkomo group formed the Peoples'
Caretaker Council (PCC), which outside
Zimbabwe called itself ZAPU.
"Instead of waging the struggle against
the Rhodesian political system, the two
groups incited their youth to attack each
other, and beat or kill even any African who
seemed to support the rival group. For fif-
teen months, the Rhodesian Europeans felt
secure while every African in Zimbabwe
lived in fear of fellow Africans. The
Rhodesian government encouraged these
misguided activities of the Zimbabwe
leaders. It reduced the strength of the
police in the African townships, and made
very few arrests of Africans killing fellow
Africans. After fifteen months, the regime
banned the two parties, and tried to appear
to the African people as their savior from
the claws of disaster engineered by the
African leaders." 16 .
In retrospect, the Ian Smith internal set-
tlement plan, inaugurated in April 1979,
must be seen as a calculated attempt to
take advantage of these two "faits ac-
complis," i.e., ideological conflicts within
the nationalist ranks and ethnic divisions
within the African society, and thus safe-
guard the interests of the White Settler So-
ciety In fact, Smith was able to exchange
his premiership with Abel Muzorewa's de-
sire to be the "First Black Prime Minister."
International Contradictions
I. Ideological conflict: East versus West. In
the study of the ideological conflict oppos-
ing the East (Marxism-Leninism) to the
West (Capitalism), scholars have failed to
emphasize enough the fact that, con-
sciously or unconsciously, the leaders of
the newly independent countries of Africa
and Asia (1960) felt the impact of that ir-
redeemable debt they owed to the Bol-
shevik Hevolution."
The fears of a pervasive social revolution
and "red peril" sweeping over the colonies
served as the sufficient politico-ideological
consideration, leading the European coun-
tries (Britain, France and Belgium) to agree
to the idea of independence to their "colo-
nies de passage." In this contextual
framework, independence became
viewed as the "safest" safety-valve of all in
the preservation of the European (Western)
interests in the continents of Africa and
Asia.
In the "colonies de peuplement," such as
Algeria and Zimbabwe however, the idea
of not granting independence was ra-
tionalized as being the "surest" oppo-
sitional exponent and deterrent to the
domino theory of social revolution and "red
peril." In Zimbabwe in particular, Smith
launched his UDI (1965) by declaiming that
"he and his colleagues, in humble submis-
sion to Almighty God, were giving
Rhodesia a new constitution so that the
dignity and freedom of all men may be
assured. "18
The mild position taken by Britain against
UDI, namely, the refusal to use physical
force "unless law and order, apparently
among Europeans only, breaks down, "19
together with the tergiversations of the
United States qovernrnent-'' (until very
recently) and the unequivocal support of
The two leading liberation
movements have both solid
ethnic bases.
South Africa'" left no doubt in any politically
astute mind that racialism and world
capitalism were intimate bedfellows.
For instance, in Antigua (1969) and in
Aden (1966), where capitalist interests
were in the hands of the British corporate
structure, Britain sent military contingents
against the so-called "natives" (respec-
tively Black and Arab) to quell attempts at
rebellion, i.e., illegally declaring indepen-
dence unilaterally 22
On the other hand, the government of
South Africa, actively supported by the
[Western] international business conglom-
erate, saw in Smith's UDI the vindication of
the similarities in historico-political devel-
opment of both South Africa and Rhodesia:
rejection of British (Socialist) imperialism
and victory of a small band of sturdy and
industrious colonists (white civilization over
"black savagery and canmbalism'j"
In 1967, following repeated failures to
achieve a majority rule, the nationalist
leaders made a sharp turn in the develop-
ment of new strategies and tactics.
This was not difficult, in view of the exist-
ence of a world socialist system which has
"ensured the possibilities for national liber-
ation of the colonies and created all neces-
sary external conditions for conducting a
successful struggle for emancipation. "24
Francis Kornegay wrote: "1967 marked the
serious beginning of a bloody revo-
lutionary, civil-racial war on the Southern
Rhodesia soil and possibly of a much wider
racial conflict on Southern Africa. "25
Unlike the Western countries which had
tended to rationalize their tacit support of
the Rhodesian minority regime, essentially
on the basis of their economic and political
interests, the socialist countries had
tended to rationalize their unconcealed
support for the nationalist leaders in search
of weapons on the basis of ideological and
geopolitical considerations.
(It is only in keeping with the contextual
framework that the Soviet Union's support
for Nkomo and ZAPU (The Patriotic Front
as of 1962) can be best understood. In fact,
Nkomo has, on several occasions in recent
years, made it explicitly clear that his link
with the Eastern bloc was dictated, above
all, by the West's staunch refusal to satisfy
his needs for weapons.
Also, it is in keeping with this dialectical
framework that China's support for
Mugabe and ZANU can be fully grasped.
Mugabe, like Nkomo, had made
ideologically expedient statements that
have helped him in moving (in the eyes of
the Western world) from the status of a pro-
fessed disciple of constitutionalism to
that of a professed disciple of Marxism.
In his analysis of the politics of Southern
Africa, James Dorman, Jr., has advanced
the thesis that the Soviet interest in South-
ern African affairs in general, and Rhode-
sian affairs in particular, was primarily dic-
tated by opportunism and geo-strategic
considerations (control of the Cape of
Good Hope).26
On the other hand, Colin Legum viewed
this thesis as being too simplistic and shal-
low to provide a fathomed view of the poli-
tics of Southern Africa. In essence, it falls
within the mold of interpretations by Ameri-
can commentators who have identified the
Soviet interest in Southern Africa "almost
solely as an extension of the Soviet cold
war competition with the West into Af-
rica. "27 Its major shortcoming, particularly,
is that it has failed to reckon with the fact
that "one cannot understand fully the true
nature of the struggle that is taking place in
Rhodesia without giving the proper em-
phasis on the rivalry between China and
the Soviet Union," and that in the final
analysis, "the exigencies and strategies of
the West and China in Africa may coin-
cide."28
23
The African effort: Stage I
From 1961 through 1972, the African states
and the Zimbabwean nationalists sought to
achieve peace by resorting to peaceful
means: mobilization of world opinion
through the United Nations and the Com-
monwealth Conference.
In close conformity with their conscious
assessment of their own strengths and
weaknesses, yet in complete misjudgment
of the weight of international contradic-
tions, the African states -long before the
creation of the Organization of African
Unity in 1963 - brought to the attention of
the United Nations the need to address the
precarious political situation in Zimbabwe.
Although at the time the world body was
still pretty much entangled in the Congo
crisis, the independent African states, as-
sisted by the Asian states, decided to push
forward Nkomo's petition. As a concomi-
tant, "The Afro-Asian states in the Fourth
(Trusteeship) Committee submitted to the
General Assembly a draft resolution asking
the Special Committee of Seventeen (later
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1980
expanded to 24) to consider whether
Southern Rhodesia had attained a full
measure of self-government."29
In the process of the debate in February
1962, the African states (Ghana, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Tanganyika
[now Tanzania] and Sierra Leone) and
Asian states, together with the member
states of the Eastern bloc, attacked Brit-
ain's stand that Southern Rhodesia lay
beyond the competence of the United Na-
tions, that only Great Britain had responsi-
bility over this territory, that since 1923
Southern Rhodesia had enjoyed a special
24 autonomous status with wide international
recognition, and that this status consisted
of full control over its internal affairs.
Britain was reluctant to bring the South-
ern Rhodesian case under the jurisdiction
of the United Nations, and the African
states resolved that Britain was trying to
protect the interests of her "kin and kith."
But, as A. Gupta poignantly noted, "the
African states will continue to keep faith in
Britain as the competent authority to bring
about a peaceful settlement in
Rhodesia." 30
In fact, from 1962 to 1965, the African
states whose demands had received a
sympathetic ear at the levels of the UN
General Assembly and even at the Security
Council, initiated a long package of reso-
lutions. It called on Britain to convene a
constitutional conference of all parties
which would ensure majority rule on the
basis of "one man, one vote," to "not trans-
fer power and attributes of sovereignty until
the Southern Rhodesian government be-
came representative of all its people and to
refuse recognition of an illegally indepen-
dent Rhodesia."31
In addition to pressuring Britain at the
United Nations, the African states took ad-
vantage of the annual OAU meetings and
the Commonwealth Conference meetings
to further mobilize world opinion.
Prior to the UDI proclamation, for in-
stance, the OAU member-states meeting in
Accra (October 1965), agreed that they
would use all possible means, including
force, against an illegally constituted re-
gime in Rhodesia. At the same time, they
also agreed to a plan of action in case
Britain granted independence to a minority
regime in Rhodesia. The plan was: to re-
fuse recognition to such a government, to
recognize a government in exile, to hold an
emergency meeting of the OAU Council of
Ministers with a view to involving the United
Nations more directly in Rhodesia, to
reconsider relations with Britain, and to
treat the white minority government in
Rhodesia on the same footing as South
Atrica.:"
Along with the weight of world opinion, it
was hoped the plan would help in compel-
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ling Britain to resolve the crisis immediately.
When Smith proclaimed UDI on Novem-
ber 11, 1965, the African states were
caught unprepared. This forced them to
resort to hasty and contradictory moves
and in fact, helped in consolidating the
Rhodesian Front position. Also, it gave
Britain needed ammunition to defend her
Britain was reluctant to bring
the Southern Rhodesian case
under the jurisdiction of the
United Nations.
concept of "return to legality" as opposed
to the concept of "majority rule: one man,
one vote." For instance, of the 36 OAU
members only 9 [Ghana, Guinea, Mali,
Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, UAR,
Algeria, Sudan and Mauritania] carried out
the Council of Ministers' November 3,1965
decision that "if by December 15 Britain
had not ended the illegal rule of Mr. Smith,
the OAU members would sever all relations
with Britain. "33This lack of a cohesive ac-
tion starkly exposed the divisions prevail-
ing among the African leaders and raised
questions about the future effectiveness of
the OAU.
On the international level, however, the
support won by the African member-states
of the Commonwealth Conference from
their Asian counterparts was instrumental
in 1965 in forcing a thorough discussion of
white minority rule in Zimbabwe.
For instance, when President Julius Nye-
rere of Tanzania failed to gain what he
considered adequate assurance that ma-
jority rule would precede independence,
he refused to sign the Commonwealth
communique at the 1965 Conference.
Again, at the Lagos Commonwealth Con-
ference in January 1966, the African mem-
ber-states succeeded, with the assistance
of their Asian counterparts, in forcing Brit-
ain to agree to the idea and im plernentation
of the Commonwealth Sanctions Commit-
tee.
As opposition from the African and Asian
leaders grew louder, Prime Minister Harold
Wilson of Britain was compelled in the end
to make a half bow to Commonwealth
sentiment. In the final communique, the
British government stated that it would not
agree to independence before majority
rule unless and until the people of Rhode-
sia as a whole were shown to be in favor. In
addition, it declared that if the regime in
Rhodesia refused to negotiate an ending of
the rebellion by the end of the year, Britain
would withdraw all its previous proposals
for a negotiated settlement of the dispute
and would sponsor a resolution at the
United Nations Security Council providing
for effective and selective mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions.>'
In keeping with both the early lack of
success recorded in the years between
1962 and 1965, when Britain refused to go
along with the African demands at the
United Nations and the lack of concerted
response to the ultimatum against Britain,
the African response to UDI in the first
stage could best be described as a mixed
record of setbacks and success. This was
partially due to the fact that, like the Zim-
babwean nationalists themselves, the
leaders of the newly independent countries
of Africa had placed a strong faith in Britain
in the realization of a peaceful settlement of
the Rhodesian crisis.
Beyond the avenues of "international le-
gal ism" and multilateral pressures against
Britain lay better arm-twisting techniques
which, though humanly less appropriate,
were logistically more realistic for the task
of effecting the goal of human dignity and
freedom: support for armed struggle.
The African effort: Stage II
In the course of the development of greater
international political consciousness
among the leaders of the African states, the
period between 1970 and 1979 stands as a
poignant landmark in the search of a .
peaceful and just settlement in Zimbabwe.
Until then, there was serious vacillation
among the African states as "to the extent
and scope to which the OAU should em-
bark on its policy of liberation," which con-
stituted one of the cardinal principles of the
OAU charter: "Absolute dedication to the
total emancipation of African colonies
which are still under colonial domination. "35
In the study of the role of the OAU in the
furtherance of the cause of liberation in
Zimbabwe, two types of inputs need to be
extricated. One is the input which is indis-
solubly linked to the role of conciliator be-
tween the warring factions of ZAPU, ZANU
and FROLIZI [Front for the Liberation of
Zimbabwe]. In 1963, for instance, the OAU,
in an effort to meet its fears of seriously
weakening the liberation struggle, ex-
tended recognition to both ZAPU and
ZANU, leading subsequently to a military
division of labor. ZAPU would eventually
operate from the southeastern part of Zim-
babwe while ZANU would eventually oper-
ate from the northeastern part.
Moreover, the OAU in 1971 withheld
recognition from FROLIZI - a newly
formed organization by disgruntled ele-
ments from both ZAPU and ZANU-Iargely
because it was disputed by ZAPU and
ZANU branches and was accused of
owing its existence to tribal cliquish ten-
dencies"
The second input is intimately associ-
ated with the moral and material support
given to the liberation movement. For in-
stance, in 1972 the members of FROLIZ I
took the decision to infiltrate Black guerril-
las inside Rhodesia for a first strike, in close
conjunction with their goal of winning fi-
nancial support from the Organization of
African Unity 37
In 1972, the various nationalist and liber-
ation factions agreed, under pressure from
the OAU, to the idea of formation of a united
nationalist front to present counter-pro-
posals to the Pearce Commission sent from
England to make another imprint in the
quest for a peaceful settlement. The new
front, better known as the African National
Council (ANC), under the direction of
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, rejected the pro-
posals of the Pearce Commission, as they
failed to tackle the real issue of majority rule
based on one man, one vote.:"
Two years later, members of the ANC,
through their spokesman Muzorewa, were
pressured by the Presidents of Zambia and
Tanzania to enter into negotiations with the
Smith regime, which at that time showed
some willingness to talk with the nationalist
leaders." The ever looming eventuality of
African victories in both Angola and Mo-
zambique, "following the coup d'etat of
April 25, 1974, which toppled the
Portuguese racist regime," drove the Smith
regime to realize Rhodesia would have ex-
tensive borders with states not likely to be
her allies. Thus, "with the prospects of the
war of liberation being intensified and the
security of Rhodesia being more and more
threatened, Smith, at last - even though
still unequivocally - decided to talk to the
leaders of the majority of that country"40
The resulting agreement, which granted to
the African majority 6 more seats to the
then existing 16 seats in Rhodesia's Legis-
lative Assembly was vehemently de-
nounced, primarily because it did not con-
cede the democratic principle of majority
rule based on one man, one vote."
In the same way as they had pressured
the disputatious leaders of the liberation
movement (ZAPU, ZANU and FROLlZI) in
1974 to enter into dialogue with Smith
under a united nationalist front, so too in
1976 the front-line states pressured them
again into merging into a "patriotic front,"
with a view of speaking with a single voice
at the Geneva Conference. This confer-
ence was heralded as the most promising
step yet taken toward providing a solution
to the crisis. It received moral and, in some
cases, practical support of many govern-
ments, including those of Britain, the
United States, the front-line states and
South Africa. The OAU also gave its bless-
ing to the initiative. And the people of Zim-
babwe, with high hopes of a final break-
through, gave their enthusiastic support.
However, due to conceptual misunder-
standings about the principle of majority
rule, the talks collapsed.
In the context of the quest for a peaceful
and just settlement in Zimbabwe, efforts
and pressures dictated by a certain com-
mitment to the principle of total eradication
of colonialism must be dialectically
weighed against those other types of ef-
forts and pressure induced by an array of
Except for Tanzania, the
frontline states of Zambia,
Botswana and Mozambique
were extremely vulnerable
economically and militarily.
personal as well as national and geopoliti-
cal interests.
Except for Tanzania, the frontline states
of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique
were extremely vulnerable economically
and militarily For instance, since 1973,
Zambia's economic torment had been in-
creasing. The closure of the frontier - ra-
tionalized by the Rhodesian authorities as
a retaliatory measure for the political
asylum and support given to the freedom
fighters - dealt a heavy blow to the Zam-
bian economy A landlocked nation, Zam-
bia depended largely on transport routes
through Rhodesia. In 1976, the total deficit
for the Zambian economy was estimated at
$240 rnillion.:"
On the other hand, Mozambique lost
more than $48 million in rail and port reve-
nues in 1976, according to published esti-
mates.
On November 6, 1976 The Economist
reported that Rhodesian army units
crossed into Mozambique killing both Zim-
babwean guerrilla fighters and Mozam-
bican soldiers."
In the midst of such devastating odds,
both Zambia and Mozambique sternly con-
tinued to provide support to the freedom
fighters-a development that hardly com-
pounds an astute political mind. In human
as well as international political affairs, lofty
principles and goals have sometimes been
ritualized in order to shield deeply con-
cealed Machiavellian sub-principles and
sub-goals.
According to Timothy Shaw and B. V.
Mtshali, for instance, President Kenneth
Kaunda of Zambia has, within the context
of the conduct of his foreign policy, skillfully
utilized the Southern African problems in
general, and the Rhodesian crisis in par-
ticular, to enhance the visibility of his coun-
try and to advance his foreign policy inter-
ests. In particular, Shaw has argued that
"Zambia's advocacy of change in Southern
Africa is inseparable from its national inter-
est and security."44 In this same framework,
it has been argued that Kaunda's staunch
support for Nkomo was inextricably linked
to his goal of serving as a "big brother" to a
future leader of Zimbabwe.
In addition to engaging in secret agree-
ment with Smith in 1974 (The Rhodesian-
Zambian Agreement), and with South Afri-
ca's Vorster in 1975 (The Pretoria Agree-
ment), Kaunda strongly advised Nkomo in
1976 to hold bilateral talks with Smith. "The
central point of the talks," wrote Sithole,
"was that certain nationalists would be ap-
pointed to positions in the Rhodesian gov-
ernment as it ,«as then constituted, with
Nkomo as foreign minister. This was the
understanding before Smith and Mr. 25
Nkomo began their negotiations. Excluded
from the discussions were Mr. Nkomo's col-
leagues in the combined African nationalist
leadership.:"
Finally, reports by well-informed Zim-
babweans have indicated that Kaunda
had, at one time, banned Robert Mugabe
from Zambia in an effort to deter outbursts
of leadership competition between Nkomo
and Mugabe. However, when it became
clear to him that the survival of Nkomo de-
pended on his ability to develop cordial
relations with Mugabe, the ban was lifted.
Hence, the emergence of the Patriotic
Front in 1976. Equally important, in a meet-
ing in Lusaka in 1976, Kaunda reportedly
pressured Muzorewa to quit the presi-
dency of the ANC and let Nkomo take over.
As a newcomer into the club of the front-
line states, President Samora Machel of
Mozambique has sought to utilize the Rho-
desian crisis as an opportunity for further
testing the stamina and the revolutionary
zeal of his popular army units (Frelimo),
especially in wake of the December 1975
rebellion against his government46
Moreover, as a consequential part of his
experience of having been at the com-
mand of the revolutionary war in Mozam-
bique, Machel has tended to support mili-
tary leaders such as the late Josiah Ton-
gogara [ZANLA commander-in-chief, who
was assassinated in January 1980.], rather
than political leaders like Mugabe. Implicit
in this attitude is the desired goal of having
someone at the reins of an independent
Zimbabwe with whom he could establish a
better and friendlier dialogue as a result of
"professional club" loyalties.
Finally, like Kaunda, Nyerere, too, suc-
ceeded in making his country the seat of
the African Liberation Committee, and skill-
fully made use of the phenomenon known
as the "politics of Southern Africa" to re-
spectively win greater international visibil-
ity for Tanzania, thereby earning the title of
statesman and political philosopher par
excellence. In his respected capacity as
the "unofficial chairman" of the frontline
states, Nyerere, indeed, was instrumental
NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL. 1980
in the realization of the ZIPA agreement in
1975.
Frustrated over the fact that he could not
arm-twist Mugabe into stepping down in
favor of Sithole, founder and first leader of
ZANU, Nyerere tried to impose a unified
military leadership that would put an end to
the perennial bickerings between Nkomo,
Mugabe, Sithole, Muzorewa and Chike-
rema.
The idea of a "third force," a composite
of military leadership units from ZANU
(ZANLA) and ZAPU (ZIPRA), was
launched with the help of Colonel Asim
26 Mbita. It was identified by Nyerere as the
most rational scheme in quickly winding up
the war in Zimbabwe. As long as squab-
bles among the civilian leaders persisted,
the prospects of a total military victory, in
his view, remained uncertain.
At the same time, in an effort to also
lessen the magnitude of the protraction of
the war effort, Nyerere in 1976 began to
work behind the scenes with Henry Kis-
singer, then-U. S. secretary of state, to
reach a peaceful and just settlement that
would be acceptable to all. In the context of
the African response to the politics of Zim-
babwe, Nyerere's concept of the end-result
of a peaceful and just settlement stood in a
dialectical opposition to Kaunda's. For the
latter, the concept of the end-result of a
peaceful and just settlement was connota-
tively tied to his efforts of "propping up"
Nkomo to the leadership summit of an in-
dependent Zimbabwe.
The quest for peace: Stage I
Like the African response, the American,
British and South African response to the
crisis must be assessed in two main histor-
ical stages. The first, from the declaration
of UDI in 1965 to the collapse of the
Portuguese colonial empire in Southern Af-
rica - Angola 1976 and Mozambique,
1975. The second, from 1975-1976, the col-
lapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, to
1979.
In contradistinction with both Britain and
South Africa, which were directly con-
cerned and immediately involved, the
United States responded to the crisis
cautiously, confining itself to the delibera-
tions at the United Nations. In close asso-
ciation with its "non-policy" stance in which
the U.S. tended to identify its interests in
Africa through the eyes of the colonial
powers, America attempted to alienate
neither the Black Africans nor the white
Rhodesians.
In an article in the U.S. Department of
State Bulletin in 1967, the U. S. Bureau of
International Organization Affairs argued
that the United States' support for the UN
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was
dictated by deep moral and legal impera-
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tives, in addition to practical consid-
erations such as the need to maintain
friendly ties with the newly independent Af-
rican states which "have sought to achieve
multiracial societies and to protect the
rights of the minorities." 47
On January 5, 1967, President Lyndon
Johnson signed an Executive Order (No.
11322), officially implementing mandatory
economic sanctions. Violation of the Exec-
utive Order was made a criminal offense."
Moreover, in 1973, U. S. Ambassador to the
President Lyndon Johnson
signed an Executive Order
officially implementing
mandatory economic
sanctions.
United Nations John Scali called for
stronger enforcement of UN sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia in the UN Secu-
rity Council while at the same time Rhode-
sian chrome had been pouring into the
United States, following the passage of the
Byrd Amendment in Congress in 1971. By
way of defending this import, which was
being carried out in blatant violation of the
then existing stiff UN sanctions, Scali noted
that the importation of certain strategic ma-
terials in 1972 had amounted to less than
five percent of the projected total of the
Rhodesian exports for that year. 49
Britain, on the other hand, which very
early had displayed conspicuously her
unwillingness to let the UN debate the
Rhodesian issue (1961-1962) on the
ground that Rhodesia was the sale respon-
sibility of Britain, had sought to solve the
crisis on her own terms. However, as E.
Wind rich observed, "the British had tried
over a decade to settle the conflict, but the
dilemma they faced was that in Rhodesia
they had responsibility without power. They
had either to accept the situation prevailing
in their self-governing colony, which meant
condoning a racially segregated society as
a basis for independence, or intervene to
alter it.
Unable, or unwilling to do either, they
opted instead for a compromise that would
paper over the more apparent differences
between the two sides, but leave the fun-
damental ones unchanged. The quest for
such a solution was evident from the vari-
ous schemes put forward by the British (the
pre-UDI offers, the Tiger and Fearless pre
posals, the Home-Smith Agreement of
1971), all of which conceded indepen-
dence on the basis of white minority rule,
but provided a facade of respectability for
token African participation." 50
In addition, first, to proposing voluntary
sanctions (1965) and then to agreeing to
mandatory sanctions (1966), Britain en-
gaged in bilateral talks with the Smith gov-
ernment (Tiger Talks, 1966), (Fearless
Talks, 1968) (Home-Smith Agreement
1971). The intransigence and shrewdness
of Smith, who knew the politico-racial
and military intentions as well as the eco-
nomic weaknesses of Britain, led to stale-
mates in these talks, further compounded
by the exclusion of the African nationalist
leaders and the sporadic squabblings
within the nationalist ranks.
Finally, South Africa, which was in dire
need of a buffer zone against the waves of
"Black peril" from the independent African
states, provided both psychological sup-
port (white civilization and Christianity ver-
sus African barbarism and communism)
and material support (non-adherence to
the UN economic sanctions, and military
assistance)
The quest for peace: Stage II
In contrast with the first stage during which
it was less pronounced - morally behind
the aspirations of the Black Rhodesians
and economically in support of the white
Rhodesians - the United States' response
to the Rhodesian crisis in the second stage
became more and more pronounced in-
sofar as it became physically involved in
the peaceful settlement talks.
In 1976, Kissinger sought to bolster his
successes in shuttle diplomacy by embark-
ing on a policy of "unrelenting opposition to
the white minority regime in flhodesia, and
strong diplomatic as well as economic
support for its nationalist opponents.">'
During his diplomatic mission to Lusaka,
Zambia, for instance, Kissinger pledged
American support for "self-determination,
majority rule, equal rights and human dig-
nity for all the people of Southern Africa."
Further, he backed the British proposals for
majority rule in Rhodesia within two years of
the "expeditious conclusion of negotiations
and outlined ten ways in which he hoped to
oblige Mr. Smith's regime to follow this
course." Far more important, "he promised
to urge Congress to repeal the Byrd
Amendment. "52
However, as K. Mufuka noted in regard to
Kissinger's Lusaka speech, the notion that
this new departure in U. S. policy toward
Black Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in
particular, was dictated by an "imperative
of our moral heritage" hardly exorcised
Kissinger from charges of hypocrisy, (In
1969, the U. S. had devised a policy toward
Southern Africa, the mission of which was
the enhancement of cooperation with the
European minority governments. However
immoral, this policy was based on the Na-
tional Security Memorandum (NSSM 39)
written by Kissinger. In it, he had advised
U. S. officials at the levels of the White
House, State Department and Congress in
"favor of a relaxation of the U.S. attitude
towards whites while at the same time tak-
ing steps to convince the black states of
the area that their liberation and majority
rule aspirations in the South were not at-
tainable by violence and that their only
hope for a peaceful and prosperous future
(lay in closer ties with white dominated
;:;tates.)53
Thus, Kissinger, by way of keeping up
the momentum he had gathered in Lusaka,
and particularly by way of maximizing his
credibility, arranged a meeting in Pretoria
(South Africa) in 1976 among the leaders of
the Rhodesian, Zambian and South African
governments. During this meeting, Smith
agreed-for the first time-to the concept
of majority rule. Kissinger who was, indeed,
very concerned about the possibility of the
Rhodesian guerrillas setting up another
Marxist state in Southern Africa-on top of
Angola and Mozambique - had decided
to "put the screws on white Rhodesia by
exploiting South Africa's reliance on
American economic and diplomatic sup-
port so as to make its government even
harder than before and force it into a prom-
ise of majority." 54
In an interview witf Newsweek on De-
cember 11, 1978, Kissinger retrospectively
insinuated that the reason the 1976 agree-
ment with Smith was not implemented was
that one of the nationalists, Joshua Nkomo,
would not participate in the new Rhodesian
government. 55However, he failed to point
out that nationalist leaders, including
Nkomo, had rejected the agreement due
largely to the fact that it sought to preserve
and entrench white minority rule. It, indeed,
left key ministerial positions - Defense,
Law and Order and Finance-in the hands
of whites 56
Finally, and perhaps more fundamen-
tally, the Zimbabwe Development Fund
which he had proposed as an integral part
of the agreement was conceived as a
strategic tool for advancing opportunities
for future U. S. investments. As such, it was
designed to provide a strong incentive for
the adoption of a non-Socialist economic
policy in an independent Zirnbabwe.?"
As part of the effort of living up to its
loudly voiced commitment to the idea of
building a new image of the United States
in the Third World, the new Carter adminis-
tration sought to salvage the U.S. input into
the settlement process of the Rhodesian
crisis by taking over where the 1976 Con-
stitutional Geneva Conference had col-
lapsed. In September, 1977, the United
States and Britain put forward the Anglo-
American proposals. Although the two na-
tions basically recognized the principle of
unconditional majority rule (one man, one
vote), the proposals were rejected by the
nationalist leaders on grounds relating-to
the mechanics for the proposed interim
government. To the nationalists, "the illegal
rebellion in Rhodesia could be resolved
only through a process of decolonization
where the British government would trans-
fer the legal powers to govern Rhodesia
directly to the Zimbabwean nationalist
leaders." 58
Under analytical scrutiny, the American
contributions to the peace effort were, in
the eyes of Ronald Libby, not very original.
Except for the proposals that the "new
Zimbabwean army was to be formed
The South African government
had decided to enter into
negotiations with the Zambian
government and the Smith
regime in 1975.
primarily from the Zimbabwean liberation
armies-ZANLA and ZIPRA-" and that a
Zimbabwean Development Fund was to be
established to "encourage commercial
capital flows especially in extractive proc-
essing and manufacturing industries," the
Kissinger and Carter administration pro-
posals were essentially and simply reitera-
tions of the British policy proposals."
Giving Libby the benefit of the doubt, it
remained no less true that it was the United
States, which to some extent endeavored
to push these proposals on Smith by arm-
twisting the South African government, not
only for the sake of the privileges of the
Rhodesian white settler society, but also for
the sake of those very interests dictated by
geopolitical considerations: the threat
posed by the Cuban presence and Soviet
involvement in Angola.
During this second stage, Britain's role in
ultimately recognizing the need for, and
furthering the cause of majority rule, must
be gauged on the basis of her strong fears
of South Africa militarily getting drawn
heavily into the conflict, endangering, in
the process, her huge investments in the
Southern tip of Africa and also of the
Commonwealth Conference breaking
down altogether. In 1977, for instance,
David Owen, then-British foreign secretary,
attended the Luanda Summit, conferring
and consulting with the South African
prime minister about how best to bring
Smith and his Front Rhodesian government
to agree to the idea of majority rule, based
on "one man, one vote."60
Furthermore, in 1979, the newly elected
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,
proclaimed during the Lusaka Common-
wealth Conference, that her government
was committed to "genuine black majority
rule in Rhodesia and independence for the
colony on a basis acceptable to the inter-
national community as a whole." Through
this declaration she mollified potentially
strident critics who sought to challenge her
as a result of an earlier statement in which
she entertained the possibility of Britain ex-
tending recognition to the MuzorewaiSmith
internal settlement government. But in
Lusaka "she conceded that the Zim-
babwe/Rhodesian constitution was de-
fective in certain respects, accepted as
valid criticisms of the power and composi-
tion of the white-dominated service com-
mission and acknowledged the need to in-
volve the Patriotic Front in the search of a
solution to the Rhodesian crisis."61
Finally, within the framework of the con-
cept of detente in Southern Africa, the poli-
tics of unconditional or genuine majority
rule must not be conceived only in terms of
contributions made by the South African
government. It must be viewed, also, in
terms of gains accruing to it.
The need to effect a new buffer zone, no
matter how politically tenuous, accounted
more than anything else for the South Afri-
can diplomatic marathon with the front-line
states. In fact, well before the United States
started to arm-twist it, the South African
government had decided to enter into
negotiations with the Zambian government
and the Smith regime in 1975. The Pretoria
Agreement, which emerged as a result of
these trilateral discussions, ultimately led
to the Victoria Falls Conference between
the Rhodesian Front government and the
African National Council (ANC). The con-
ference ended in a deadlock, however,
largely because Smith stuck on "no major-
ity rule" while the African nationalists stuck
to their demand of "majority rule now." 62
In allowing Kissinger, Smith and Kaunda
to meet in Pretoria for follow-up talks in
1976, South Africa was sending signals to
the world community that its white minority
regime was not opposed to socio-racial
and socio-political changes in Southern Af-
rica. But the Kissinger agreement which
emerged from these talks was rejected be-
cause it was silent on the democratic prin-
ciple of majority rule based on one man,
one vote.63 In this vein, all the other moves
of South Africa, namely its participatory
roles in the Geneva Conference (1976) and
in the discussions leading to the Anglo-
American Proposals (1977), acquire a
greater explanatory force.
In this complex diplomatic chessboard,
the role and place of Ian Smith and his
.Rhodesian Front government must neces-
sarily be reckoned with. Failure to do so is
to stray away from the central fact that the
tergiversations of the United States, Britain
and South Africa, on the one hand, and the
dissensions and rifts within the nationalist
movement are closely knit to the moves,
responses and stands of Smith and the
Front Rhodesian government.
27
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Smith and the Rhodesian Front govern-
ment, at the first stage, stood intransigent
when it came to the issue of the preserva-
tion of the privileges of the white minority
society They capitalized on the unwilling-
ness of Britain to use force, the ambiva-
lence of the United States government, the
declared support by South Africa, and the
undefined nature of the response of the
African nationalists.
On the other hand, during the second
stage, they sought to still preserve and sal-
vage the interests of the white settler soci-
ety by making concessions in the various
talks involving the United States, Britain,
South Africa and the nationalist leaders.
The rejection of these concessions, in all
instances, by the nationalists gave Smith
and the Front Rhodesian government the
necessary ammunition for defying the
arm-twisting tactics from the "big
brothers". In this way, in March 1978, Smith
and the Front Rhodesian government
came up with their own internal settlement
plan, as part of an effort to circumvent the
impact of the Anglo-American proposals.
As it was, they hoped to secure a settle-
ment more favorable to their white constitu-
tents than the Anglo-American proposals
put forward in September 1977 by David
Owen, then-British foreign secretary, and
Andrew Young, then-U. S. Ambassador to
the United Nations." Paradoxically, their
inability to secure international recognition
for the Black-led government of Bishop
Abel Muzorewa, on the one hand, and their
ultimate recognition of the fact that African
majority rule was unavoidable, on the other
hand, led them to the Lancaster House
Agreement in 1979. By means of this
agreement, they came to terms with the
idea of a peaceful settlement based on
majority rule ONE MAN, ONE VOTE.
Through the elections of February 28, 1980,
the peace process was finally consum-
m~~. 0
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Ntozake Shange
ForZAKI-
Who Dances the Bomba
By E. Ethelbert Miller
'look sassafrass, i jus want you to be
happy with yourself/you wanna write
n creat new images for b1k [olksl,
One year before my 30th birthday I find
myself growing old rapidly. Nothing
amazes me anymore. Too much is
predictable. When my friend, Grace
Cavalieri, called and told me she had a
review that Michael Harper had written
about three Black poets, I knew what to
expect. One simply needs an
understanding of literary personalities
and cliques to get around the language
landscape of Black America. I knew if
Harper was reviewing the work of three
poets - Robert Hayden, Quincy 'Iroupe
and N tozake Shange - his personal
enthusiasm for Hayden's work would
overshadow any comments he might
have for the work of the other two.
Two days later, when I opened the letter
from Grace, I was correct. Harper's
review of Hayden's American [oumal
was as follows:
Mr. Hayden's precision and economy
is ubiquitous in this volume; his use
of slang, nick-names and the common
parlance of the street is full of charm
and never overdone.2
Quincy Troupe's Snake-Back Solos was
looked upon as "a miscellany of
achievements and confusions.", Harper.s
comments of Ntozake Shange's nappy
edges were downright ludicrous and
unwarranted. For instance:
Ntozake Sbange's "Nappy Edges" is
too long a book; there are far too
many poems that borrow from and
reflect upon popular culture without
dramatizing the inner conflicts of
many of Miss Shange's characters.4
Too long a book! One is puzzled that
Harper would be disturbed at the length
of a collection. Especially when Robert
Hayden's Angle of Ascent is only 17
pages shorter than nappy edges and his
own book, Images of Kin, surpasses
Shange's by 65 pages.
Iam afraid it's Shange's subject matter
and use of popular culture that Harper is
against. Harper's dissatisfaction with
Shange's contribution and his demand
that she give us more is the equivalent of
asking for better programs on television.
Her work reflects (successfully) our
culture; it does not attempt to transcend
or penetrate any further than the
commentary offered on the evening
news. It is a massage, a new way of
feeling and looking at things.
Critics often have difficulty accepting
literature that uses popular culture as a
base. We still expect poetry to sound like
something we can't understand, or
something that should appeal to the
intellect and not the emotions.
Shange seldom offers insight as
literate as those expressed in the
epigraphs scattered through Nappy
Edges.s
The writer's ability to draw upon
popular culture for subject material and
technique has resulted in contemporary
literature being as exciting as many of
the other arts. If I prefer Bob Marley to
Robert Lowell it is simply a question of
which one is more a part of my life, not
who is the better poet. But let me stop
here and put several things into
perspective.
First, although Huey Newton and
Eldridge Cleaver are still battling with
the American judiciary system, the '60s
are over and the '70s have ended. It is
1980 and a point of demarcation
must be drawn. Second, it should be
acknowledged that our more "signifi-
cant" Black writers are not only Robert
Hayden or Michael Harper, but instead,
Toni Morrison, Alice Walker, Jayne
Cortez, June Jordan and Ntozake Shange.
[This review was written before
Hayden's recent death). Third, our failure
to acknowledge the influence of various
social movements upon our literature
has resulted in a misunderstanding of
what is actually being written. Need I
say more?
this is for ntozake
of the painted sacred monkeys
on the beaches of the caribbean
the chinese ladies weep
into their ivory fans
as she dances the bomba«
For quite a number of us, Ntozake
Shange has been as fascinating as the
bomba. Her play "For Colored Girls,"
continues to reverberate throughout the
Black community. John Storm Roberts
describes the bomba as consisting of
"melodies of short phrases repeated a
great deal; varied, complicated
rhythms.":
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"For Colored Girls" was an outgrowth of
seven poems which Shange developed in
1974 while living in the Bay Area. The
multi-ethnic climate gave rise to a
flowering of women writers - Janice
Mirikitani, Carol Lee Sanchez, Thulani
and Alta. Alta, poet and publisher, at one
time saw Shange as being one of the
more neglected writers in the Bay Area.
To best understand Shange's work, one
must first place her inside the Women's
Movement. Her involvement with
activists in California places her closer to
advocates of women consciousness than
to the Black Panthers who emerged out
of Oakland. Shange taught in the
Women's Studies Program at Sonoma
State College, where she began to
broaden her perspectives as an artist and
a woman.
More stable as a source of inspiration
eV historical continuity was the
Women's Studies Program at Sonoma
State College, where I worked with
1- 1- Wilson, Joanna Griffin, eV Wopo
Ho1up over a three year span. Courses
designed to make women's lives eV
dynamics familiar to us, such as:
Women As Artist; Women As Poet;
Androgynous Myths in Literature;
Women's Bibliography I eV II; Third
World Women Vl-Titers,are
inextricably bound to the
development of my sense of the world,
myself, eV women's language»
Her poems, "For Colored Girls," were
modeled after Judy Grahn's "The
Common Woman." The first
performance was at the Bacchanal, a bar
for women in the Bay Area.
The beginning of "For Colored Girls" is
somewhat like the film "Cooley High"
(especially the party scene) in which
Shange gives us what "American
Graffiti" could not ... an insight into
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Black adolescence from a female
viewpoint.
i got drunk eJ cdnt figure out whose
hand waz on my thigh/but it didn't
matter cuz these cousins martin eddie
sammy ieiome eJ bobby waz my
sweethearts alternately since the
seventh grade"
30
Similar expressions can be found in
Sonia Sanchez's Blue Book For
BlueBlack Magical Women.
remember parties
where we'd grinddddDDDD
and grinddddDDDDD
but not too close
cuz if you gave it up
everybody would know and tell
and grinddding was enough. the
closeness
of bodies in ptoject basements»
It is not only Shange's ability to
capture these moments of our lives but it
is her tendency to restore the humor and
the joys of that experience that makes
one applaud "For Colored Girls." At the
same time, the material is painful and
filled with emotional disappointments
and fear. Our lives are filled with the
violence of knives and guns and the
scarifications of rape.
Beverly was my size eJ that started it.
In the slums. Even we called them
that, but all my later friends lived
there. Behind those metal fences for
the playground. I never went there too
much, or only at night to donee eV
walk that fat girl home. They were all
hip eV beautiful. Even now, coming to
strange things. Like this mist pushing
off the day. Strange. These strangers
are beautiful. Be wary of them. 11
Shange's voice is one of a Black girl
growing up during the '50s. A time of
segregation. Emmett Till, a 14-year-old,
was murdered in 1955. Shange introduces
to us the frustrated dreams of Black girls
growing into women. "1955waz not a
good year for lil blk girls", she cries
through the voice of the lady in brown.12
In her chorepoem, "For Colored Girls,"
Shange has two selections on identity
The first is "somebody almost walked off
wid alIa my stuff." Nowhere does Shange
define what her stuff is but she alludes to
the fact that she is talking about her
identity with such lines as:
eJ it waznt a spirit took my stuijtwaz
a man whose ego walked round like
Redan's shadow/waz a man faster n
my innocence waz a lover/i made too
much room for/n
Recurring words keep appearing in
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Shange's work. She is concerned with
the idea of space or room, which is
another way of referring to boundaries.
The space belonging to women is
violated every day in the home of
numerous families. Women are beaten
and subjected to abuse by their husbands
at an alarming rate. This subject is .
explored in Shange's piece, "a nite with
beau willie brown." It begins by Shange
stating "there waz no air." This is a
reference to space, to the existence of a
vacuum in which we find Crystal living.
Crystal is subject to the abuse of Beau
Willie who is a Vietnam war veteran.
Shange explains the reason for his
violence.
eV crystal went eV got pregnant
again/beau most beat her to death
when she to1 him/she still gotta scar
under her right tit where he cut her
up/still crystal went right on eV had
the baby/so now beau willie had two
childtenls»
Here we find Crystal subjected to
violence as a result of her sex and
biological capacity to bear children.
Shange's poem ends with Beau Willie
dropping Crystal's children out of the
window. It follows after Beau Willie
demands that Crystal marry him.
Crystal's inability to respond causes
Beau Willie to drop the children.
Although the violence in Shange's
poem is unsettling, an important factor
-Crystal's need to be herself-is
overlooked. To have air and space. To
discover her identity without Beau Willie
and even her two children. The poem
about Beau Willie is followed with the
words, "i waz missin somethin." Shange
concludes "For Colored Girls" with:
i found god in myself
eV i loved her/i loved her fiercely. 1S
Wesee here the power and need for
self-discovery achieved only after
considerable pain and suffering.
Some Black people have been disturbed
by the Beau Willie Brown character in
Shange's play, considering it to be a direct
attack on Black men. I don't believe this
was Shange's intention. She is not a
radical feminist singling out men as the
primary problem in our society, instead
she is a Black artist opening our eyes to
the totality of our dilemma.
And no matter how many times I
quote from actual conversations when
I build characters from real, living
people, who exist in our world and
function here, if I put them on the
stage, they are more difficult for the
audiences to believe than the people I .
make up. That to me is very, very,
painful. 16
As Julianne Malveaux correctly
perceived in her recent article in Black
Scholar, Shange's play is a poem and not
a polemic. It offers "a slice of Black life,
not a series of generalizations and
statements about Black men and
women."!" In her self-interview that
appeared first in MS. Magazine, Shange is
aware of how artists lose control of their
work, its purpose and meaning. She is
aware of how the media manipulates
what she produces.
so the next time an interviewer said
all he wanted waz for me to soy
something controversial abt blk men.
i said i love them. that waz no press at
all. 18
Following the success of "For Colored
Girls," Shange wrote another poemplay, a
photograph: a still life with shadows/a
photograph: a study of cruelty. It was a
production with a male protagonist but it
did not last long on the stage.
I think the reason why we didn't last
any longer is because white people
don't want to hear about brilliant
black men and Sean David was
brilliant. Not only that, he had great
ambition and he also hod no
references that had anything to do
with them. So they closed US.19
Few of us are duplicates of our
grandfathers, in either thought,
feeling, speech, or appearance. Very
often we even differ from our fathers,
too, in most of these respects. We are,
to a large extent, new people - as
everything in America, and in many
other parts of the world, tends, for
better or worse, to be new. 20
During the latter part of the '70s, an
interesting occurrence began to take
place in world politics. Cuba, a small
socialist island in the Caribbean, began
to have a major role in determining the
spheres of influence of other countries.
Through an aggressive foreign policy,
Cuba began to support an international
anti-imperialist movement. In Angola,
Cuban soldiers were able to assist in the
defeat of the Southern Africa military
machine. One direct result of Cuba's
activities in Africa was an immediate
redefining of geo-political boundaries. No
longer was Cuba confined to the
Caribbean and Latin America, instead it
had begun to penetrate as far as the horn
of Africa.
Welive in what Marshall McLuhan
defined as a global village. Weare subject
to the same problems and concerns as
those of our neighbors. Race, class and
sex are boundaries that can be crossed
anytime.
The Women's Movement of the 70s
was a direct outgrowth of the Black
liberation movement of the '60s. It
seems strange, therefore, for politically
conscious Black people to resent the
influence of this movement upon their
own. Perhaps it was the absence of a
Black woman in the forefront of the
Women's Movement that separated it
from the Black community. This absence
of Black participation in the leadership
resulted in the movement being
considered a "white thing" - when
actually it was a movement that deeply
affected the living conditions of all
women.
The poems and prose of Ntozake
Shange, like other ideas and concepts,
move beyond the Black community;
especially the Black literary community.
Her work is broad and should not be
confined. Her women characters would
be at home in New York, Paris or
Port-Au-Prince. In this sense, her
creations are similiar to that of the jazz
musicians she so readily admires. For
decades, Black jazz musicians have been
like today's Cubans moving throughout
the world, instrumenting change.
Shange's poetry hints at the coming
birth of a new woman - one capable of
defining her own space, and at the same
time demanding that a new man step
forward. It is ironic that Shange's poetry
occurs at the exact moment progressive
jazz musicians are moving to the
forefront. Underneath much of Shange's
work is a love for the Chicago Art
Ensemble, as well as the music of Oliver
Lake, David Murray and other members
of the World Saxophone Quartet.
Unfortunately, some of us are critical of
Shange while praising David Murray. We
place demands on our poets.
we want a poet to talk like an
arena/or like a fire station/to be
everywhere/all at once/even if we
never been there/but especially if
we've never been there/we expect a
poet to clear a space/not her space/not
a secret/not a closed room/but the
town. we assume the poet to be the
voice of everywhere we are not/as
opposed to bein 'everything we aieu
Wenever complain about how
musicians live. Yet our scholars point at
tozake Shange and babble nonsense.
Robert Staples, discussing the work of
Michelle Wallace and Shange in Black
Scholar wrote:
While the personal background of an
author is no defensible basis for
judging their work, I find it difficult to
overlook it in the case of these two
women. Both came from very
middle-class backgrounds, had some
involvements with street brothers,
and are now urging black women to
go it alone. That may not be all that is
important about them; it is all I
know. 22
Is Staples familiar with the poetry of
Judy Grahn? Has he spoken to C.L.R.
James recently? The personal background
of an author is no defensible basis for
judging the work.
A few months ago I wrote a poem for
Shange.23It was composed as
encouragement for this woman to
continue. So much depends on the
freedom of our poets. In Chile, Neruda
still lives. Let us not kill our own
comrades in this land north of south. D
E. Ethelbert Miller is director of the Afro-American
Resource Center at Howard University.
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Night Watchmen
boIl't you know the enemy
1attack.you in your sleep."
ile you're layin' easy in the night.
When you think
changed
and everythirlgj
and yet-all .'
Suspended Ani
suspended
animation
floating on
a thin line
of sanity
abstraction
&. reality
hanging by a
thread of
laughter
fear
anger
loneliness
tears-
hang glides soar
caricatures
galore
i will be your cart
as in
woody w
because
he had
nothing better to
do
than to glide
with the
mainstream of life
flowing With the current
productively
producing
programmed to
project
a caricature
of tangible dreams
making it real
only because
more than one can see ...
but what .if this
is all an abstraction
c'ofa cartoon
Sa-to your mind
Fromth&iD.ner sanctum of your
cllioughts
TlUough your own psychic images
Tolinprove the quality of your life-
To ceuquer what you believe to be true
To dance to your creative self
To revel in your own innocence.
Say hello to your mind
From the realm of your own private
>screening chamber
Through the power of self-consciousness.
Deliberately choosing where you want
to go
Deliberately selecting happiness over
unhappiness
Deliberately holding on to what you
need at any particular moment.
Say hello to your mind
From the curiosity of your higher self
Through the fantasy which makes you
believe in God
To feel the inspirations of life
To deepen your feelings of love
To experience other dimensions of self
To soar beyond the bonds ofYour
present limitations.
Say hello to your mind
From the drifting channels outside your
body
Through the space in front of your closed
eyes
To an exciting new adventure in
freedom
To expand your intellect into intuition
To believe you govern yourself
To believe your images are
self-fulfilling prophecies.
Say hello to your mind
From the private confirmation of your
own universe
Through the maze of confusion which
govern your life
To know where you are is limited by
where you
think you are .
To know how to release your own
blocked energy
To capture your own natural flow and
unleash your
own self
To know what you perceive in life is
what you are.
or painted
-illnsions in His being?
then that makes us .
all a fantasy
perhaps living in the.
line of a t.v. show
hanging by a thread
and due to faulty
Programming
Ratings
Boredom
Dillutions
Distortions of
what should be-
the producer cuts
the string
away we all go
in suspended
animation
to live no more ...
Janet R. Griffin
Columbia. Md.
Marsha Romaine Harden
Rialto, Ca.
~Pay attention to me:
Pay attention to me, blacKman!
Please hear what I say.·~
Touch me gently, blackman,
See me, hear me, talk to me today. ,
Give me your anger, fears and
frustration;
Give me your hatreds, give me your love,
Then, there is nothing down here or
above
-To prevent our true communication,
Pay attention to me, black man!
Open.up your heart to me, your very
soul-
With me, you don't have to assume a
. role,
Please, don't beafraid.confide.in me;
'Come, stand right heie;J;lesideme,
Please, black p1an, . • e
For I am your lovin
Pay attention tonle>b.a man
Please, before it is too late!
Juanita Norman
Howard University
Analytical Respect
I enjoyed fraternizing with
the intellectuals.
They produced my show.
debating
arguing
learning
laughing
. Socializing with them.
They were inspiring, plausible
and disgusting
Declaring what they know.
Larry E. Cody
Washington, D. C.
Rastaman Rock
Rasta man rock freedom song
'Bout ways we ought to be
Rasta man's pulse is comin' strong
Flyin' 'cross the sea
Touchin' my heart with rebel roll
Openin' my mind shakin' my soul
Shine with your risin' reggae light
Paint us a future, map out a fight
Rasta man rock lifeline tune
Speakin' of bein' free
Rasta man say sunshine soon
Be reachin' out for me
Callin' on powers held within
Waitin' to spring, needin' to win
We'll brew ancient potions
For plantin' the notions
Leadin' to victory. .
Marlene Graham
Jamaica, N.Y

